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Abstract
This paper presents a simple model that explains a number of empirical observations on
initial public offerings. The model assumes that the firm which intends to go public is
best informed about the future prospects of the firm. The apparent incentive for the firm
to overprice the offering creates a market for an intermediary that can certify the
estimated value of the firm. In this paper the decision problem of establishing a proper
offer price is condensed into a simple loss-function for the intermediary. The paper
shows that under fairly general conditions underpricing will arise. The expected
underpricing will be a function of a few simple parameters.
JEL classification: G14, G24.The Pricing of Initial Public Offerings: A Simple Model
Introduction
Initial public offerings are rapidly becoming one of the most thoroughly researched topics
in empirical finance. An extensive survey of the results obtained for IPOs in different
countries can be found in Loughran, Ritter and Rydqvist (1994). The results in these
IPO studies confirm the original findings in Ibbotson (1975), and Ritter (1987) that IPOs
are underpriced in the short run. The average difference between the price at which the
stock starts trading when listed and the subscription price is too large to be explained by
the risk characteristics of the firm.
This paper presents a simple model that explains these observations. The model can be
seen as a generalisation of the model in Beatty and Ritter (1986). Like in Beatty and
Ritter (1986) the pivotal agent in the pricing decision is the underwriter. In this paper the
underwriter’s decision problem is compressed into a simple loss function which includes
the loss of reputation that is playing a crucial role in the Beatty and Ritter (1986) paper.
As such the present model also encompasses some other hypotheses that have been
advanced to explain the observed pricing of initial public offerings.
In contrast to the Beatty and Ritter (1986) this paper does not rely on a split between
informed and uninformed investors. In IPOs differences in opinion in the Harris and
Raviv (1993) sense, between investors trying to asses the value of the firm, will play a
substantial role. Lacking an observed market price, experts looking at the same firm are
highly unlikely to come up with exactly the same estimate of the value of this firm.
Thus the abstraction with informed investors that know the true value of the firm and
uninformed ones that do not know it, is not a very accurate description of an IPO. This
paper substitutes the informed-uninformed split with a simple firm-specific downward
sloping uncertain demand curve. In this respect the paper builds on Baron and
3Holmström (1980) and Baron (1982) where it is assumed that the underwriter is able to
increase the demand for the issue by lowering the price or increasing the selling effort.
In contrast to papers by Allen and Faulhaber (1989), Grinblatt and Hwang (1989), Welch
(1989) which also assume that the firm itself is best informed about its future prospects,
signalling is not present in this paper. Again, the reason is that the true value of the firm
is assumed to be unobservable for all participants in the IPO market. Thus, no easily
interpretable signal is available. All participants are forced to base their actions on
uncertain estimates of the value of the firm
1.
The outline of the paper is the following: In the next section the general setting for the
model is explained. The following section specifies the decision problem faced by the
underwriter and derives some general results. The fourth section derives some further
results by restricting the demand for the IPO to be log-linear in the offer price. The fifth
section summarises the paper.
Background
There are three different groups of participants in the IPO market: 1. the firm that intends
to go public, 2. potential subscribers of the initial offering, and finally 3. underwriters.
These three groups differ with respect to the information that they posses about the firm
but also in their incentives for accepting biased or unbiased estimates of
1 In contrast to the paper by Chemmanur (1993), in which underpricing is required to induce investors to
collect information about the firm this paper relies heavily on the need for an underwriter. The investor’s
decision whether to subscribe or not is not explicitly modelled in this paper.
4the true value of the firm.
2
In the following we will assume that the IPO is in the form of new equity intended for
new shareholders. The IPO firm is assumed to act as an agent for its old shareholders.
Everything else equal, this firm wants to get the highest possible price. In other words,
the firm itself has an incentive to accept an upward biased estimate for its value. The
potential subscribers, on the other hand, would, everything else equal, like to buy the
shares at a price which is as low as possible. These investors have an incentive to accept
a downward biased estimate for the value of the firm. Finally, the third group, the
underwriters, have to strike a balance between both sides of the market. Thus, they will
have an incentive to come up with an estimate which is not, at least obviously, biased in
one direction or the other. However, as we shall see they are unlikely to settle for an
offer price which equals an unbiased estimate for the value of the shares.
In principle the firm that plans to go public could sell its shares to the public without any
intermediation. However, if all firms would do that without exception the market’s
unbiased estimate of the true value would be the average for these kinds of firms. Going
public without intermediation would thus not be worthwhile for firms that are better than
the average in their group. Accordingly, the only firms that would like to go public
without intermediation would be the ones which are below the average. Since the better
firms would drop out, the market would adjust its estimate. This would cause the firms
close to the average to drop out inducing a further market adjustment, and so on,
ultimately leading to a market failure. Hence, the need for intermediation to reduce the
2 This is especially important for the certification role performed by the underwriter. The fact that the
certification role is lacking in the Baron and Holmström (1980) and Baron (1982) model allows Muscarella
and Vetsuypens (1989) to test the model by comparing cases in which underwriters arrange their own IPOs
with cases in which underwriters arrange IPOs for client firms. Their results reveal that these IPOs do not differ
with respect to their degree of underpricing leading them to reject the model. However, their results follow
naturally the certification role of the underwriter. The underwriter’s incentives will be different in its own IPO
than in its clients’ IPOs. This difference in incentives is obvious to the market. The underwriter is not able
to certify its own subscription price and thus a higher degree of underpricing is, ceteris paribus, required when
the underwriter arranges its own IPO than when it acts on behalf of a client.
5information asymmetry
3 in an IPO.
4
The task of the underwriter is to reduce the information asymmetry that exists between
the firm and the stock market. To accomplish this the underwriter is making a thorough
inspection of the firm with the aim producing an unbiased estimate of its true value. On
the basis of this estimate the underwriter certifies the offer price. This certified estimate
is considered trustworthy by the market mainly because of the repetitive nature of the
underwriter’s business. The market knows that by accepting biased estimates, in favour
of the firms that plan to go public, the underwriter would gradually ruin its reputation
among sophisticated investors
5.
The reason why the underwriter is forced to rely on sophisticated investors is the same as
the one which drives the IPO firm to use an intermediary. Even an unsophisticated
investor realizes that an underwriter that avoids investors who are known to be
sophisticated is probably overpricing.
In the following we will assume that the underwriter is facing a downward sloping
uncertain demand curve for the issue, that is, the larger the offering the lower the price
has to be for the underwriter to obtain enough subscriptions. There are several
justifications for this assumption
6.
3 The information asymmetry could in principle also be reduced by the existence of a credible signal . The
reason why underpricing as such will not work as a signal as suggested by Allen and Faulhaber (1989),
Grinblatt and Hwang (1989), Welch (1989) is that the true value is unobservable. See also the empirical results
obtained by Jegadeesh, Weinstein and Welch (1993).
4 See Booth and Smith (1986) for an elaboration of this argument for underwriting in the case of new issues
of equity. In Leland and Pyle (1977) this argument is used in a general explanation for why intermediaries are
needed to prevent market failure in the raising of new financing by firms.
The basic idea builds on the seminal article by Akerlof (1970).
5 See Beatty and Ritter (1986).
6 A survey of arguments and empirical evidence in support of a finite price elasticity for a firm’s shares are
found in Loderer, Cooney and Van Drunen (1991).
6To begin with, if the underwriter’s success in selling the issue will depend on the
willingness of a small group of sophisticated investors to pick up a significant part of the
issue, then a larger issue should require a higher premium to compensate these investors
for forgone diversification benefits. This is consistent with the "cascade" theory advanced
by Welch (1992): Other investors will wait for a commitment from those investors who
are supposed to be most competent in judging the value of the firm. When investors
observe that the most competent ones are willing to risk their own money, others will
follow.
The second justification for a downward sloping demand curve for the IPO is easily
explained in the framework of Merton (1987): The underwriter’s task can simply been
interpreted as that of inducing enough investors to include the IPO firm in their
information sets. By offering a higher expected return, more investors will be persuaded
to include the firm in their information sets.
The third justification for a downward sloping demand curve is based on the size of the
issue as an important, easily available, piece of information for potential subscribers. If
the size of the offering is large compared to the size of the firm, the project for which
the funds are needed has to be large compared to the present operations of the firm. This
is likely to make sophisticated investors asses a higher probability for a failure than if
the investment project would be more reasonably sized.
The Underwriter’s Decision Problem
The underwriter’s incentive to establish a subscription price which closely corresponds to
the true value of the firm, makes the underwriter the pivotal agent in setting the
subscription price. In the following the decision problem faced by the underwriter is
specified, and the optimal offer price is characterised. It is shown that a rational
underwriter is likely to choose an offer price which is below the unbiased estimate for
7the value of the firm.
The market for underwriting services is assumed to be atomistic. There is a large number
of underwriters which are small relative to the size of the market. This allows us to focus
on a representative underwriter. From basic micro economic theory we know that in the
long run equilibrium the fees charged by this underwriter will correspond to minimum
costs.
The task of the representative underwriter is to determine the per share offer price P0, the
share price, at which the issue is offered to the public
7. The underwriters relevant
conceptions concerning the potential market for the IPO can be summarised by the
following subjective demand schedule:
(1) Q = Q (P) + ,
where Q is the quantity that the market will accept, P is the per share price for the new
shares, Q < 0, and is random variable, with an expected value equal to zero.
The dispersion parameter for , denoted s* for simplicity, will depend on the amount of
information (I) that the underwriter is willing to collect about the firm and the potential
demand for its IPO:
(2) s*=s *(I), s*< 0 , s *> 0 ,
the negative first derivative s* meaning that by collecting more information about the
firm the underwriter is able to establish a more precise estimate for the demand for this
IPO, and the positive second derivative implying a decreasing marginal benefit of
7 This is a simplification justified by our focus on the pricing problem. In practice the underwriter is offering
advice on a whole package including the size and the timing of the issue, the use of warrants, and other things
which may affect the attractiveness of the issue among potential subscribers.
8additional information.
The task of the underwriter is to establish, together with the firm, a per share price Po,a t
which the issue is offered to the public
8. Assume that there is a given sum that the firm
wants to raise with the issue. Together with the underwriter the firm will decide on a
quantity Q* and a price Po which enables them to raise this sum. Once this is done and
the issue has been offered to the public the market will decide. If the actual demand for
the issue at that price turns out to be at least as large as the size of the issue we will call
the issue a "success", and if the actual demand falls short of Q* we will call it a
"failure".
Denote the share price on the first day of trading when the firm has been listed by Pm.
Making the simplifying assumption that this price reflects the demand during the
subscription period, the underwriter’s decision problem that was spelled out in terms of
the issue size
9 can be rephrased in terms of the share price. Pm ³ Po would then be a
"success", and Pm <P owould be a failure. Furthermore, the demand schedule (1)
transforms the uncertainty concerning the quantity demanded, which is the relevant state
variable, to uncertainty regarding the price, which is the decision parameter.
The underwriter’s objectives can now be expressed as a function of the pricing error in
the form of the following asymmetric loss function, which for simplicity excludes all
costs that do not depend on the offer price:
8 Note, that size of the issue as such is easily available information for the market. A specified number of
shares transmits a more favourable piece of information to the market than leaving the number open. The latter
alternative is an obvious indication of over pricing. In the extreme: maximising the number of shares sold
would be an optimal policy for the old shareholders only if the shares were overpriced. The practice of
announcing certain limits allowing the firm to issue more shares up to a given maximum in the case of
oversubscription can be explained by the relatively low marginal cost of this equity once the fixed costs of the
issue have been incurred. Thus, it makes sense for the firm to replace some of its planned financing from other
sources with this equity if more than the required amount is offered by subscribers.
9 It is assumed that the price elasticity of demand will never reach or exceed -1. Thus the sum that can be
raised in the IPO will increase as the price is lowered.
9(3) L = cs (Pm -P o ) 1 (Pm ³ Po)+( C f+c f (Po -P m ))1(Pm <P o ),
where
1 - is the indicator function, taking the value 1 if the condition is true, 0 otherwise,
cs - is the cost parameter connected to a successful public offering, and
Cf,c f - are the cost parameters connected to a public offering that fails.
For simplicity the cost in case of a success is assumed to be proportional to the
difference between the market price and the offer price. The cost consists of two
components: firstly, there may be a tangible cost: the reward to the underwriter may be
smaller if the offer price is lower, secondly, there is the intangible cost: the reputation of
the underwriter will suffer among potential entrants if they think this underwriter is
selling the shares to the public too cheaply
10.
The loss in case of a failure consists of two parts: firstly, there is a fixed part (Cf) which
corresponds to the loss of reputation, - firms do not want to engage an underwriter in the
process of planning an IPO just to experience that it fails
11, secondly, there is the part
which is proportional to the overpricing (cf): if the IPO is overpriced, and the offering is
guaranteed the underwriter will be forced to keep the unsubscribed shares. Even in the
absence of any guarantees investors will loose their confidence in underwriters who are
trying to sell overpriced shares. Furthermore, the more overpriced the issue is, the more
10 Beatty and Ritter (1986, p.225) report a significant loss of market share for underwriters with large pricing
errors. James (1992) studying the relationship between IPOs and subsequent offerings conclude that: "These
results suggest that the deviations from optimal IPO pricing carry a penalty for the underwriter" (p.1865).
11 This explains why underwriters seem to engage in propping up the price of the stock in cases where the
equilibrium price on listing would have been below the subscription price, as documented by Ruud (1993) and
Hanley, Kumar, and Seguin (1993), and Schultz and Zaman (1994). Schultz and Zaman (1994) write: "While
it is not necessary for a model of IPO underpricing to predict aftermarket support, it is plausible that the same
factors that make it desirable for IPO stock prices to rise above their offer prices explain the effort and expense
that underwriters incur to maintain prices of IPOs above their offer price." (p.218). Price support can be
incorporated in the present model by treating them simply as a method for the underwriter to spread out the
losses incurred by overpricing in time.
10negative attention the issue is likely to get
12. The costs for overpricing also include the
expected costs of law-suits from dissatisfied investors. Thus the model encompasses the
so called law-suit avoidance hypothesis advanced by Tinic (1988).
Given the loss function (3) what remains to be determined by the underwriter together
with the firm that intends to go public is the optimal offer price. This decision includes
the decision on the optimal risk of a failure.
The optimal offer price is found by minimising the expected loss of the underwriter.
Taking expectations on both sides of (3):












cf(Po Pm)f ( P m )dPm
The distribution function f is obtained by solving expression (1) for Po. Since q is strictly
monotonic the impact of additional information on this distribution function will be the
same as in (2).
Taking the derivative of (4) with respect to Po yields:
(5) . dEL
dPo





12 The actual loss function, especially its tangible part, will depend on the contract between the issuer and the
underwriter. That the contract matters is shown by Ritter (1987). He shows that the underpricing in the case
of best efforts contracts in the US is higher than in the case of firm commitment contracts. Since the costs for
overpricing will be higher for the underwriter in the case of a firm commitment contract than in a best efforts
contract this seems to contradict our theory. However, it seems likely that client firms that choose the best
efforts contract are the ones that find the firm commitment contract too expensive. By accepting a contract
which makes the loss function for the underwriter ’flatter’ with respect to overpricing the client obtains a higher
offerprice. Consistent with this Ritter (1987) shows that the outcome is more uncertain for the best efforts
contract.
11The necessary condition for a minimum yields the following expression for the optimal








As a special case assume that cs =c fand that the fixed costs Cf = 0. Expression (8)
immediately gives us the intuitive result that the offer price should be chosen so as to
make the probability of success = ½, that is, the offer price should be set at the median
of the probability distribution. If the fixed costs Cf > 0 the optimal price will lay below
the median even if cs =c f . Finally if cs <c fthe optimal offer price will always remain
below the median.
The actual size of the parameters in the loss function will depend on the contract
between the issuing firm and the underwriter. E.g. if the underwriter guarantees the issue
cf will be higher than if the there is no guarantee. Consequently the required underpricing
will, other things equal, be higher when the issue is guaranteed than when it is not.
Institutional settings will also affect the parameters in the loss function. Thus, cf will be
higher in a country where there is a considerable probability that the underwriter will
face a law-suit if the IPO fails, than in a country where is this is unlikely. A detailed
analysis of differences in the loss functions faced by underwriters in different countries
may, in fact, explain a considerable part of the differences in average initial returns
reported for 25 different countries in Table 1 of Loughran, Ritter and Rydqvist (1994).












12To find an analytical solution for the price in (6) or (7) will be difficult since Po appears
in the limit of the integral on the LHS, as well as in the numerator on the RHS. That a
solution actually exists is seen by the fact that LHS will go from 0 to 1 as Po goes from
¥ to 0, whereas the RHS will converge towards , which is below 1, from above
cf
cf cs
when Po -> 0. Since the LHS is monotonically decreasing in Po while the RHS is
monotonically increasing, in the relevant range, the solution is unique.
Under the fairly general assumption that the distribution function f is unimodal and
monotonically increasing below the modal value, and furthermore assuming that the
initial optimal Po will be below the modal value, the comparative statics for an increase






* is the solution to (8). The reason is that an increase in s will, ceteris paribus,
cause a drop in the LHS of (7) while it will increase the RHS. To restore the equality the
value of Po must fall.
The result in (8) is consistent with the empirical observations that the average under-
pricing is higher when the offer price is fixed months before the listing than when it is
fixed close to the listing (See e.g. Loughran, Ritter and Rydqvist, 1994, Table 2). It also
consistent with the finding that the average underpricing is higher for young firms than
for old firms (see e.g. Loughran, Ritter and Rydqvist, 1994, Figure 2).
Log-linear demand
By restricting the functional form of the demand function in (2) we may derive some
13further results. Assume that the demand is log-linear in the price, that is:
(9) ln(Q) = a - b ln(P) + ,
where -b is the price elasticity of demand, and is assumed to be normally distributed
around zero with a standard deviation of s.
Denote the price at which the expected value of the logarithm of the quantity demanded




*) = E[ln(Q)] = a - b ln(P
*).
The optimal probability of failure is now given by expression (7). Accordingly the price
should be set so that the expected logarithm of the quantity demanded equals:






-1 is the inverse of the standard normal cumulative density function.
The optimal offer price is the solution to the following equation which is obtained by
putting the expectation of the RHS of (9) equal to (11):
























13 At this price the expected value for the quantity demanded will be higher than the size of the initial public
offering (Jensen’s inequality).
14where the RHS contains a product of two expressions, the first one being the price under
certainty and the second one the modification imposed by the presence of uncertainty.
A simple solution is obtained if the fixed costs of a failure Cf equals zero. In that case
(12) reduces to:
























Expression (13) provides us with some further interesting comparative static insights. The
offer price will decrease with:
1) an increase in the size of the offering,
2) an increase in the uncertainty concerning the demand, and as before
3) a decrease (increase) in the costs due to underpricing (overpricing).
An additional interesting conclusion that emerges from (13) is that the required
underpricing (given the price under certainty) will increase with a decrease in the price
elasticity of the demand. This implies that the required underpricing will be higher in
less liquid markets. This in turn is consistent with the observed tendency for IPOs to
occur mainly when the market turn-over is high
14.
It is fairly easy to prove that the comparative static results above will hold also when Cf
is larger than zero, that is, in the general case of (12), provided that the derivative is
taken for an offer price which is below the mean of the distribution. The technical reason
is that the additional term, which is not included in (13), will re-enforce the original
change. That is, if the price drops when the fixed cost is not taken into account then it
has to drop even more to restore the optimum when the fixed cost is included.
14 For international evidence see Loughran, Ritter and Rydqvist (1994).
15Going back to expression (2) it easily seen that there is a trade-off between underpricing
and obtaining a more precise estimate for the value of the firm. More information will
reduce s, and thus through (12) the required underpricing. On the other hand more
information will imply larger information costs.
Since the returns to more information in the form of a more precise evaluation of the
firm are decreasing there will be a cut-off point where the collection of more information
will be unprofitable. Since the cost of collecting information about a firm are in part
independent of firm size this point is reached earlier for small firms going for small IPOs
than for large firms. This explains why a larger underpricing on an average is observed
for small firm IPOs than for large firm IPOs.
Going back to expression (6) it seems clear that underpricing is what we would expect in
the case of IPOs. Does this mean that those who subscribe to IPOs are making excess
profits? No, because usually when there ex post turns out to be underpricing there will be
quantity rationing. Quantity rationing together with a downward sloping demand curve
will imply the existence of a winner’s curse (Rock, 1986). The winner’s curse means that
an undiscriminatory subscription policy will yield a large number of shares when the
offering is not that popular and a small number when it turns out to be highly popular.
As shown by, e.g. Keloharju (1993), the average return for undiscriminatory large scale
subscriptions may thus become negative in spite of a significant average underpricing.
Summary
This paper presents a simple model for the pricing of initial public offerings. The model
can be seen as a generalisation of the model in Beatty and Ritter (1986). Like in Beatty
and Ritter (1986) the pivotal agent in the pricing decision is the underwriter. In this
paper the underwriter’s decision problem is expressed in the form of a simple loss
function. The paper substitutes the informed-uninformed split in Beatty and Ritter (1986)
16with a simple firm-specific downward sloping uncertain demand curve.
The optimal offer price is determined by the penalty that the underwriter is facing as a
consequence of a pricing mistake. It is argued that pricing errors implying under- or
overpricing will always be costly for the underwriter, and that this cost will depend on
the size of the pricing error. Obviously, these costs include those that are written into the
contract between the client and the underwriter. In addition there are intangible costs like
loss of market share due to a battered reputation either among potential IPO firms or
among potential subscribers for the IPOs.
It is shown that in the case where these costs ad up to a symmetric loss function with no
fixed costs for failure the underwriter would opt for the median of the price distribution.
A positively skewed distribution for the price on the day of listing would then be enough
to imply an offer price which is below the mean of the distribution, i.e. underpricing.
However, it is unlikely that the loss function is symmetric. The more likely case is that
pricing errors that imply overpricing are more costly for the underwriter, and that there
may be a fixed cost attached to a failure. In that case the underwriter would opt for an
offer price which is below the median, i.e. for deliberate underpricing. The evidence that
underwriters engage in price support to prevent the price of the shares to fall below the
subscription upon listing as documented by Ruud (1993) and Hanley, Kumar, and Seguin
(1993), and Schultz and Zaman (1994) indicate the presence of a fixed cost attached to
apparent overpricing, a cost which the underwriter avoids by buying up the excess
supply.
Finally, the results from the comparative static analysis showed that the underpricing is
expected to increase with, an increase in the size of the offering, an increase in the
uncertainty concerning the demand, a decrease in the price elasticity of the demand, and
an increase (decrease) in the expected costs due to overpricing (underpricing).
17A challenge for future research is to try to specify the differences in the loss functions
that will arise in different institutional settings and when different types of contracts
between the issuer and the underwriter are employed. Once these differences are
specified the correspondence between the predicted optimal IPO-pricing and observed
actual pricing of IPOs can be analysed.
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